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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING'S RESERVED COVERAGE OF KISSINGER HINTS LITTLE PROGRESS

The 29 November joint communique marking Secretary Kissinger's 25-29 November visit to Peking announced that President Ford would visit China in 1975, but its characterization of the talks was notably less expansive than communiques following the Secretary's two visits in 1973. This year's brief communique merely noted that the two sides "held frank, wide-ranging, and mutually beneficial talks," failing to review past progress or to indicate any specific topics of discussion or agreement. The communique did not mention Secretary Kissinger's 25 November meeting with Chou En-lai in the hospital. Unlike the two 1973 visits, there was no meeting between Secretary Kissinger and Chairman Mao; the November 1973 communique had called attention to the "friendly atmosphere" of their conversation and had noted Mao's "greetings" to President Nixon.

Peking gave full coverage to the Secretary's activities in China, and accorded him treatment approximating that for a visiting foreign minister of a country having diplomatic relations with Peking. Except for changes necessitated by Chou's illness, the protocol handling of the visit was almost a carbon copy of his last visit a year ago. He was greeted and seen off at the airport by Foreign Minister Chiao, and the Chinese negotiating team was headed by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.

At the formal banquet hosted by the Chinese on the 25th, Chiao declared that "on the whole Chinese-American relations have in these years been moving ahead" and expressed the belief that the visit would "contribute to the further implementation of the Shanghai communique." At the reciprocal banquet on 28 November Chiao gave no indication that progress had been made. He said merely that the two sides had reviewed international and bilateral developments "in a candid spirit" and noted the willingness of both sides to work for "the continued advance of Sino-American relations" in the context of the Shanghai communique. The November 1973 banquet speech by then foreign minister Chi Peng-fei had noted the "concrete" nature of the discussions on broadening bilateral exchanges, and had expressed "confidence" that Sino-American relations "will make steady progress towards the goal of normalization." On that occasion NCNA had reported Chi's toast to "the health of President Nixon and to the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples." Peking did not report any such toast this year.

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MOSCOW Soviet coverage of Secretary Kissinger's visit was brief and factual; comment has been restricted to citations from the Western press. On 29 November TASS promptly reported that President Ford would visit China in 1975, and Moscow radio on the 30th quoted the communique in reporting that the two sides held "frank, wide-ranging, and mutually beneficial talks." Subsequent comment replayed from Western press sources has suggested that little progress resulted from the visit: IZVESTIYA on 30 November noted the AFP correspondent's assessment that the visit was "not expected to lead to any significant progress," a TASS dispatch on 1 December stated that American papers "unanimously" saw no progress resulting from the meetings, and a 2 December Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast quoted the AFP assessment that "Sino-American relations continue to improve, though at a slow pace." The broadcast also raised the routine Soviet charge that China has backed down on the issue of Taiwan, encouraging U.S. contacts while U.S.-Taiwan relations continue unabated. Similarly, a TASS report on 30 November cited the Washington POST as the source for a "senior American official's" remark that the Chinese "did not bring strong pressure on the issue of Taiwan."

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW CONTINUES SUMMIT PUBLICITY, AVOIDS ARMS DETAILS

Moscow has continued to maintain a moderate level of publicity on the results of the Vladivostok summit, focusing on the political aspects of the meeting but avoiding any mention of the details in the agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The main item in the post-summit publicity was the formal party-government statement of approval issued on 29 November. Specifically approving "Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's activities," as well as the results of the meeting, the statement struck a lofty note in speaking of the contribution of the meeting to the "delivery of mankind from the threat of a new war." This theme has been reiterated in the media comment, including editorials in IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA on 30 November and 1 December, respectively.

As expected, Moscow has not announced the numerical ceilings on delivery systems and MIRV vehicles that were verbally included in the arms accord guidelines, nor has it acknowledged that the agreement included such specific details. TASS reported President Ford's meeting with congressional leaders on the 26th, at which this information was privately conveyed, and also the President's press conference on the 3rd, at which it was publicly announced. On neither occasion, however, did it indicate that this subject was discussed. The closest any Soviet commentator has come to acknowledging that the agreement included such details was a statement by Sergey Losev in a commentary to North America on the 27th that the future arms accord would be based on a "specifically agreed number of strategic delivery vehicles and a specifically agreed number of MIRV intercontinental and submarine missiles."

The editorials in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA were basically glosses on the party-government statement. Both struck the themes of continuity between the Vladivostok summit and past summits, the importance of making the process of improving Soviet-American relations "irreversible," and the potential contribution of this process to insuring world peace. IZVESTIYA was more florid, saying that it was "impossible to exaggerate" the significance of the Vladivostok summit; PRAVDA was more staid, saying that the summit could be evaluated as a "constructive contribution to strengthening world peace."

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The only top leadership statement on the summit, apart from Brezhnev's speech in Ulaan Bataar on the 26th, was Podgornyy's brief reference in his speech in Tadzhikistan on the 29th. Podgornyy referred to the party-government approval of the results of the meeting and reiterated the main points of that endorsement, but judging by available summaries of his speech, he did not go beyond these formal generalities. Indeed, in linking the results of the summit with such other indications of improving relations with major Western countries as the recent visit of Chancellor Schmidt to Moscow and the forthcoming talks between Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing, he seemed to be implicitly diminishing the unique importance of Soviet-American relations.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

MOSCOW BOOSTS PUBLIC SUPPORT OF PLO, AVOIDS FULL ENDORSEMENT

Moscow's public treatment of the 25-30 November USSR visit by a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headed by Chairman Yasir 'Arafat has conveyed an impression of increased Soviet support for the PLO. However, despite a general emphasis on Soviet-Palestinian "solidarity," certain aspects of Soviet comment on the visit and portions of the 30 November joint Soviet-PLO communique hinted at persistent disagreements between Moscow and the PLO on several issues. The main divergences seemed to be centered on the extent of Moscow's official recognition of the PLO, the envisioned details of a future Palestinian state and their implications for Israel, and the appropriate nature of Palestinian representation at a future Geneva conference.

TREATMENT OF VISIT Compared to the last previous PLO visit on 30 July-3 August, Moscow accorded a notably enhanced status to the latest delegation, particularly in terms of increased publicity and higher-level political discussions. By far the most significant prestige symbol was the delegation's meeting on the 27th with Kosygin, which marked the highest level of publicized talks to date between Soviet and PLO officials. This meeting gave the delegation's visit a more official character than previous PLO visits, whose specified or apparent Soviet sponsors had been the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization and other unofficial "friendship" groups. Also serving to elevate the PLO's status was a publicized meeting on the 28th between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Yasir 'Arafat. In addition, a TASS report in PRAVDA on the 26th indicated that, compared with last summer's visit, the group of Soviet officials who welcomed the PLO at the airport on the 25th had been upgraded by the addition of a deputy foreign minister.*

Despite these signs of increased public support for the PLO, Moscow treated the delegation with some discernible restraint. For example, Soviet media failed to specify who was host or sponsor for the visit, even though the meetings with Kosygin and Gromyko could have been construed--as they were in a Belgrade radio commentary on the 29th--as a sign that the delegation had been official guests of the Soviet government. In addition, there was no indication in Soviet

* An apparent by-product of the PLO visit will be a new Moscow radio program for the Palestinian Arabs. According to Moscow radio's Arabic service on 2 December, a weekly program "for the Palestinian Arab people" was to begin on 4 December. Similar broadcasting features had previously been instituted for various Arab states, e.g., the "Egyptian Corner" and the "Iraqi Republic Corner."

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media that the delegation, or 'Arafat alone, met with Brezhnev during the visit. Some Arab sources, namely Beirut's AN-NAHAR on the 22d and the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on the 26th, had confidently forecast such a meeting.

RECOGNITION OF PLO Moscow held back from using the latest PLO visit to announce an official and explicit endorsement of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative" of all Palestinians. The 30 November joint communique, which could have served as a vehicle for such recognition, stated only the sides' "satisfaction" that the October 1974 Arab summit conference in Rabat had so recognized the PLO. The communique thereby reiterated the same formulation used in the Soviet-PLO communique last August, when the sides "noted with satisfaction the importance" of PLO recognition as sole representative by previous summit conferences in Algiers (November 1973) and Lahore (February 1974).

Moscow's continued reluctance to endorse the PLO outright is probably due in large part to reservations over becoming identified too closely with specific objectives the PLO may express, particularly in regard to Israel's right to exist as an independent state. PLO spokesmen have often stated that their "ultimate aim" was to replace present-day Israel with a "single democratic secular state" and establish a new Palestine. The PLO's publicly expressed attitude toward Israel has thus contrasted sharply with Moscow's longstanding support for Israel's existence as a state and with Moscow's frequently expressed position that a final Mideast settlement must satisfy the interests of "all states and peoples" involved in the conflict.

PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD During the recent PLO visit, Soviet media provided some indications that Soviet and PLO positions have continued to diverge over the issue of Palestinian statehood. Moscow reiterated generalized expressions of its support for the Palestinians' right to self-determination and statehood, while continuing to affirm that the security of all states in the area must be guaranteed. In expressing this position. Soviet media have often cited passages from Brezhnev's 26 November speech in Ulaan Baatar. TASS on the 27th, in an apparent attempt to indicate a similarity of Soviet and PLO positions, carried an interview with 'Arafat in which he quoted with approval Brezhnev's remarks the previous day on a Mideast settlement, including Brezhnev's reference to the need for "reliable and authoritative guarantees of the security and independence of all countries now involved in the conflict." This reference--with its clear implication for Israel's right to independent existence--was omitted from all subsequent reports on 'Arafat's remarks in Moscow media, including later TASS reports from 27 to 29 November, a 28 November PRAVDA report using the original TASS interview, and Moscow radio broadcasts on the 27th and 28th.

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Soviet-PLO disagreements were also hinted at in the 30 November communique's characterization of the talks overall as a "detailed exchange of views" held in a "friendly atmosphere." TASS on the 27th had characterized the PLO delegation's talk with Kosygin as being held in an "atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding"--a characterization also used for the overall visit and talks in the August 1974 communique. The omission of "mutual understanding" from the most recent communique was especially noticeable, since the next passage stated simply that "the delegation informed Soviet leaders about the PLO's position concerning the Palestine question" and other issues.

The 30 November communique nevertheless implied a possible modification in the PLO position when it stated that both sides had welcomed the October Rabat conference resolution on "establishment of an independent Palestinian national authority, under PLO leadership, on Palestinian territory that will be liberated during the withdrawal of Israeli forces from seized Arab lands, as demanded by well-known UN decisions." In fact, the Rabat resolution, while otherwise similar to the communique's language, made no mention of "UN decisions" in the text as reported by Egypt's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 28 October. The reference is apparently to UN Security Council resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967 and the subsequent resolutions calling for its implementation. Resolution 242 requires in part Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict," and another portion affirms the necessity of "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area." The PLO's evident willingness to associate itself with "well-known UN decisions" is highly unusual, since this could be construed as a change in PLO policy toward accepting Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders and away from its insistence on recovering pre-1947 partition territory. The vague phrasing of the communique allows for varying interpretations, presumably including PLO advocacy of individual passages within a given resolution.

REPRESENTATION
AT GENEVA

Another topic discussed that failed to produce complete Soviet-PLO agreement was the desirability of reconvening the Geneva conference and the question of selecting the exact Palestinian representation for such a conference. The 30 November communique noted that the Soviet side had expressed its position that an overall Mideast settlement could best be achieved through a reconvened Geneva conference and that at such a conference "representatives of the Arab people of Palestine must take part on an equal footing with other participants." Although Moscow has used this formulation in the past, the Soviet-PLO communique issued last August had specified that Moscow "expressed support for the participation of the PLO in the Geneva

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peace conference, exercising equal rights with other participants." Moscow has thus appeared to vacillate in specifying a PLO presence at Geneva. However, viewed against the Soviet public position on this issue since last January, Moscow has also continued a trend of at times alternating its references to general Palestinian and specific PLO representation at Geneva, thus keeping its options open on the issue.*

* For highlights of these alternating references; see the TRENDS of 23 October 1974, pages 5-6; 31 October 1974, pages 4-5, and 6 November 1974, pages 6-7.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

USSR CALLS FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS ON ALBANIAN ANNIVERSARY

Moscow used the occasion of Albania's 30th liberation anniversary, 28-29 November, to affirm on an official level its readiness to reestablish relations with Albania, broken off in 1961. Thus, Moscow's greetings message from the Soviet government addressed to the "fraternal Albanian people," as reported by TASS on the 28th, explicitly called for the "normalization of relations." Although routine Moscow propaganda continues to issue such calls sporadically, this is the first official endorsement of the notion since Brezhnev's speech at the 24th CPSU Congress in March 1971. Moscow's annual greetings on Albania's liberation anniversary have normally been sent by the Soviet-Albanian Friendship Society, but the message on the 25th anniversary in 1969 was, as this year, from the Soviet government. The 1969 message, however, called only for the development of "friendship and cooperation."

Moscow's East European orthodox allies, which maintain charge-level relations with Tirana, avoided any reference to "normalizing" relations in their anniversary messages; however, like Moscow, East European media did call for normalization, as they have from time to time.

As in the past, Tirana did not acknowledge the greetings from Moscow and its allies, and Politburo member Hysni Kapo, in a 28 November speech reported by ATA, echoed earlier comments by Hoxha and Shehu in stating flatly that "Albania has not and will not have relations with the Moscow revisionists." However, as on the 25th anniversary in 1969, the Albanians hosted receptions in their embassies in East European capitals.

ROMANIAN, YUGOSLAV RELATIONS Bucharest, which had not been represented at the 25th Albanian liberation anniversary in 1969, showed its interest in improving ties between the two countries by sending a high-level delegation led by Ion Patan, member of the Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee and foreign trade minister. Albanian-Romanian relations, which were neither broken nor downgraded by Tirana in the sixties, have improved steadily since Romania gained favor in Albanian eyes by censuring the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Patan, whose attendance was played up prominently by the Albanians, met both with Shehu and the head of the PRC

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party-government delegation, Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan. Romania's warming relations with Albania and the PRC were underscored by the 27 November inauguration of a Peking-Teheran-Bucharest-Tirana air link operated by the PRC's civil air lines. Romanian interest in improving relations with Tirana was also evident in the warm greetings sent by Ceausescu and Manescu to Albania's party-state leaders as well as by the staging of festive celebrations in honor of the anniversary in Pitesti and Bucharest, the latter attended by high-level leaders Manescu and Oprea.

Belgrade treated the anniversary with marked official warmth. Tito, in his greetings message addressed to Lleshi, expressed "confidence that goodneighborly relations" between the two countries would develop, and media comment emphasized the recent declarations of both Albanian and Yugoslav leaders in support of better relations. Although full state relations were renewed in 1971, deep ideological differences have prevented the establishing of party ties. While Belgrade did not send a delegation to the Albanian ceremonies, Yugoslav efforts to improve relations were marked by a Tirana reception hosted by the Yugoslav ambassador and attended by cabinet-level members of the Albanian Government.

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INDOCHINA

COMMUNIST MEDIA ASSAIL UNGA VOTE ON CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATION

The 27 November UNGA adoption of a resolution advocating a peaceful settlement in Cambodia and deferring the question of Cambodian UN representation was denounced, as was last year's vote on Cambodia, in a statement by Sihanouk and press comment from Peking and Hanoi.* Both the Chinese and North Vietnamese expressed support for Sihanouk's stance rejecting negotiations and promising continued fighting. Moscow took note of the vote in a 28 November TASS dispatch which observed that the Lon Nol regime would continue its "illegal" retention of the UN seat. TASS reported without comment that the resolution urged nations to use their influence to bring about a conciliation between the Cambodian belligerents.

CAMBODIAN FRONT The 28 November Sihanouk statement, carried by NCNA on the 30th and AKI on 1 December, denounced the UN resolution as an effort to save U.S. neocolonialism and "its servile creature" in Phnom Penh, and rejected the suggestion of negotiations--"even if under UN auspices"--as a "gross and intolerable insult" to Cambodian "martyrs." The statement acknowledged bleakly that, "in the face of the most powerful imperialism in history," the armed struggle "will be long and requires us to make more and greater sacrifices." Speaking at a 2 December Pyongyang banquet opening a good will visit to North Korea, Sihanouk again charged that the UN resolution was a "cunning plot of the United States" and an attempt to "unwarrantedly and shamelessly" shift the responsibility for the war from the United States and Phnom Penh to the resistance movement. He pledged not to accept any "compromise of ceasefire" and to continue armed struggle for "5 years, 10 years, and even for 20 years if necessary." A 2 December communique from the Front news agency AKI echoed Sihanouk's call for struggle without "compromise or negotiations" but was less pessimistic in predicting that "the last days of the traitorous clique in Phnom Penh can be prolonged only for a while."

PEKING Peking's reaction to the UN vote came, as it had last year, in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. The 1 December article endorsed Sihanouk's 28 November statement, including his rejection of negotiations, declaring that "the

* Reaction to the 5 December 1973 UNGA passage of a resolution to defer the Cambodian question is discussed in the 12 December 1973 TRENDS, pages 12-14.

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Chinese people resolutely support this solemn and just stand." The paper criticized the United States as the promoter of the resolution and charged that Washington wished to use the United Nations to force the RGNU to enter negotiations so as to "legalize U.S. imperialist aggression and interference in Cambodia and make the Cambodian people accept an 'American peace.'" Echoing PRC representative Huang Hua's 26 November UNGA speech, which had maintained that "U.S. aggression is the sole root cause" of the war in Cambodia, the Commentator article claimed that the "key" to a Cambodian settlement was "for the U.S. Government to stop at once all its support and aid for the traitorous Lon Nol clique and let the Cambodian people settle their own affairs by themselves without any outside interference." Huang had also offered the support of the Chinese Government for the Cambodian Front's earlier rejection of negotiations in statements by Sihanouk on 5 October and Khieu Samphan on 6 November.

NCNA's account of Sihanouk's 2 December Pyongyang banquet speech noted his criticism of "subversive maneuvers by U.S. imperialism" on the questions of Cambodia and Korea, but it carefully deleted following passages--reported by KCNA--which maintained that the diabolical nature of "U.S. imperialism" has not changed even with the changing of Presidents and that "the policy of Gerald Ford is nothing but the vile extension of that of Richard Nixon."

HANOI North Vietnam denounced the UN vote on Cambodia in press and radio commentaries, including a commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN reported by the radio on the 30th, which focused criticism on President Ford. Comment on the same day in the party paper NHAN DAN and on the radio went further than Cambodian Front media and Peking in attacking supporters of the U.S.-favored resolution, specifically noting the role of Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines. For example, the radio declared that passage of the resolution "laid bare the hideous faces of the lackey U.S. allies including Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, and certain other governments which have given the United States a helping hand in its wars of aggression against Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos."

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DRV MINISTER SETS CONDITIONS FOR TALKS ON THAI RELATIONS

Hanoi radio and VNA on 3 December publicized a letter from DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Day Trinh to Thai Foreign Minister Charunphan Itsarangkun which promised for the first time that North Vietnam would enter "immediately" into negotiations on "normalization of relations" if Thailand would change its policies toward the United States and Indochina. Specifically the letter listed as preconditions for talks Hanoi's demands that the Thai Government end "collusion" with the United States and the presence of U.S. military forces in Thailand, and "respect the fundamental national rights" of the Indochinese peoples. "The only obstacle to the normalization of relations," according to the letter, is the Thai Government's "pursuance of a policy aimed at furthering U.S. imperialist designs of aggression and intervention in Indochina." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, published along with the letter on 4 December, focused even more attention on the issue of U.S. forces, declaring that the U.S. troops and bases in Thailand were the "sole obstacle" to normal relations.

The letter appears to be part of a concerted Hanoi effort to pressure Bangkok into requesting the withdrawal of U.S. forces. While Hanoi has discussed the issue of DRV-Thai relations in foreign ministry statements in the past, the Trinh letter is the first such authoritative public communication to Thailand on the subject and it seems calculated to focus maximum attention on the issue of the U.S. military presence. Although VNA reported that the letter was dated 27 November, it may have been drafted much earlier since Trinh was in Eastern Europe on that date and had not been in evidence in Hanoi during all of November.

Over six months ago when Hanoi first stated conditions for the establishment of "friendly relations" with Thailand--in a 12 May NHAN DAN observer article--the demand for a withdrawal of U.S. forces was not specified. The article called upon Bangkok to "stop its collusion" with Washington, cease slandering Hanoi's intentions, and release Vietnamese residents in Thailand who had been "illegally detained." In the intervening months the fate of the Vietnamese in Thailand appears to have become a subsidiary issue and it was not mentioned in the current letter.

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The issue of DRV-Thai relations was last raised by the DRV Foreign Ministry on 18 October when it issued an interview with a spokesman for its information department who stated that official DRV-Thai exchanges must await a change in Bangkok's "hostile" policy toward Vietnam but that unofficial contacts between the two peoples would be beneficial.* Trinh's letter did not mention the possibility of unofficial contacts but a 3 December Hanoi radio commentary on the letter reaffirmed that "the Thai Administration's hostile policy can in no way prevent the friendly relations between the Thai and Vietnamese peoples from developing to the benefit of both peoples."

NGUYEN DU'Y TRINH HEADS ECONOMIC GROUP IN USSR AFTER GDR VISIT

Providing the first indication that a USSR-DRV economic agreement for 1975 will probably soon be forthcoming, TASS on 4 December reported that Premier Kosygin had met with DRV Foreign Minister and VWP Politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh, who was "heading a DRV economic delegation." According to TASS the two sides conducted talks on mutual relations, "in particular economic and scientific-technical cooperation and aid by the Soviet Union to the DRV in 1975," and Kosygin confirmed the Soviet Union's "unswerving line of providing assistance and support" to the Vietnamese people. On the previous day a Moscow domestic broadcast had revealed that Trinh was in Moscow and met with USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko but had not mentioned his economic mission.

Trinh had apparently come to Moscow from the GDR sometime after a 26 November meeting with SED Politburo member Hermann Axen. The 27 November NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reported that Trinh was in the GDR for a "health cure" when he met with Axen, but a belated 2 December Hanoi VNA account of the meeting made no reference to Trinh's medical condition. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND also reported that Trinh had "other meetings" with Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Gerhard Weiss, who led a GDR economic delegation to Hanoi on 4-12 November 1974 to conclude "cooperation and mutual assistance" agreements for 1975, and with Foreign Minister Otto Winzer. It is not known how long Trinh was in the GDR; his arrival was not reported in the media, and his last known appearance in Hanoi was on 28 October.

* See the TRENDS of 23 October 1974, pages 13-14.

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U S S R

STALIN'S ROLE IN WORLD WAR II LAUDED BY CONSERVATIVES

New signs of contention over treatment of Stalin's role as war leader have surfaced recently. Ivan Stadnyuk's novel "War" had been attacked in a 17 September KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA review for embellishing Stalin's image and ignoring his mistakes. But this review was assailed in the November issue of the literary journal MOSKVA by its conservative deputy chief editor Anatoliy Yelkin, who defended Stadnyuk's favorable picture of Stalin. Praise of Stalin's wartime role had also been voiced by Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy in an 18 October speech and, according to the press, was greeted with applause. Moreover, on 25 October PRAVDA announced that the late Marshal Zhukov's memoirs have been revised to present a more favorable picture of Stalin's wartime leadership. The timing of this renewed agitation on the issue may be connected with the current work on a new 12-volume history of World War II which would presumably require high-level reconsideration of basic interpretations.

STADNYUK NOVEL The issue of Stalin's role was raised sharply and directly by conservative writer Ivan Stadnyuk, who attempted in his novel to depict how Stalin and his military and political lieutenants operated at the beginning of World War II. The first part of Stadnyuk's novel had appeared in the Stalinist journal OKTYABR in December 1970; it described prewar discussions and negotiations by Stalin and Molotov, the USSR's efforts to prepare for war, and finally the Nazi attack in June 1941. It was promptly lauded in a 24 April 1971 RED STAR review for "objectively" depicting Stalin's role as leader and presenting the "historical truth" about 1941. The second half of the novel, covering the first month of the war, was printed in the May 1974 issue of the ultraconservative journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA.

In the sharply critical review of the novel in the 17 September KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Gorkiy University docent Vadim Baranov complained that Stadnyuk had depicted Stalin as a skilled military leader even at the beginning of the war. In refutation, Baranov cited a statement by Marshal A.M. Vasilevskiy, Stalin's chief of the General Staff, that Stalin had only learned how to be a military leader later in the war. Baranov charged that in embellishing and exaggerating the role of Stalin, Stadnyuk had been guilty of "political tactlessness" and had ignored the "evaluations of our historical science."

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Baranov's attack provoked the immediate angry rebuttal from MOSKVA deputy chief editor Anatoliy Yelkin. Writing in the November MOSKVA (set in type the day after the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA review appeared and signed to press on 14 October), Yelkin accused Baranov of name-calling, of distorting Stadnyuk's portrayal of Stalin, and of misusing the Vasilevskiy statement. Far from presenting a whitewash of Stalin, said Yelkin, Stadnyuk had presented Stalin's defects as well as merits. Yelkin then proceeded to refute Baranov's negative assessment of Stalin's abilities, declaring that Vasilevskiy had rated Stalin an "outstanding" military leader and that Marshal Zhukov had also praised his excellent mastery of military operations and had described him as "undoubtedly a worthy Supreme Commander." Yelkin, who claimed to have been consulted by Stadnyuk while the latter was preparing the book, lauded the novel for defending the "highest truth" of 1941--the all-embracing confidence in ultimate victory--and for rising above the usual low-level battleline experiences to concentrate on the actions of Stalin and his generals. The novel's aim of justifying the actions of Soviet leaders is clear from the fact that, as Yelkin revealed, its original title had been "Generals See Further."

CREDIT FOR STALIN Other signs of pressure to upgrade the evaluation of Stalin's wartime leadership include the 18 October speech by Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy. He took advantage of the ceremony on the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the Ukraine to draw attention to Stalin's wartime role. According to the 19 October RADYANSKA UKRAINA account, Shcherbitskiy declared that:

The preparation and implementation of the biggest military operations, including those on the territory of the Ukraine, was conducted by the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command headed by chairman of the State Defense Committee Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin (applause).

While this statement is consistent with the current official formula, such gratuitous references are seldom included in leadership speeches. PRAVDA's short summary of Shcherbitskiy's speech left out this sentence. In contrast to Shcherbitskiy, there was no mention of Stalin whatever in the speeches of Lithuanian First Secretary Grishkyavichus, Estonian First Secretary Kebin and Latvian First Secretary Voss at the liberation ceremonies in their own republics on 15 July, 20 September and 19 November, respectively.

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The announcement in the 25 October PRAVDA on a revised edition of Zhukov's war memoirs reported that a new chapter on the work of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had been added; the announcement explained that this addition was for the express purpose of giving a new, "objective evaluation" of the Supreme Command's role and of refuting the negative picture of "Soviet strategic leadership" promoted by bourgeois historians.

These renewed efforts to upgrade Stalin's wartime image may be connected with the writing of a new 12-volume history of the war. A 29 November TASS report announced that a forthcoming issue of KOMMUNIST would carry an article by Marshal Vasilevskiy and historian Boris Trukhanovskiy refuting Western accounts of Soviet conduct of the war. It mentioned that they were editing the first two volumes of this new work.

CREDIT TO MOLOTOV The Stadnyuk affair also draws attention to the apparent partial rehabilitation of Molotov which seems to be taking place in Soviet historiography. The novel devoted considerable attention to Molotov, who comes off favorably as Stalin's confidant and righthand man and as a top statesman who handled especially difficult tasks. It described in detail his prewar mission to Berlin to negotiate with the Nazis, and it highlighted his prominence as a leader by mentioning his radio address to the Soviet people in June 1941 to announce the Nazi surprise attack. Stadnyuk even described a Politburo meeting at which Stalin, referring to the Berlin mission, had said: "Comrade Molotov, I don't envy you. It's a hard mission. But history will not condemn us if by diplomatic maneuvers we can win a few years of peace for the Soviet people." The novel noted that Stalin, when he set up the State Defense Committee in 1941, had immediately picked Molotov as his deputy chairman and that they had discussed together who else should be on this all-powerful committee. While Molotov is mentioned dozens of times in the novel, other Politburo members such as Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beriya are mentioned only rarely. Yelkin's article also treated Molotov as an honored leader, noting that great events were associated with the names of "Stalin and Zhukov, Molotov and Voroshilov." As a sign of Molotov's partial rehabilitation, a favorable biographical entry on him recently appeared in the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA.*

* See the TRENDS of 6 November 1974, pages 26-27.

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PROGRESSIVES GAIN IN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ELECTION

The 26 November election of new members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, reported in the 28 November IZVESTIYA, appears to have strengthened the progressive faction in the academy's departments of economics and of philosophy and law. The economics department, led by influential innovator N.P. Fedorenko, director of the Central Mathematical Economics Institute, is already dominated by progressives, while the philosophy and law department, led by Stalinist F.V. Konstantinov, is heavily conservative.

The two new full members of the economics department are A.G. Aganbegyan, progressive director of the Siberian department's Institute for Economics and Organization of Industrial Production, and G.A. Arbatov, director of the USA Institute. The two new corresponding members are Ye. M. Primakov, deputy director of the progressive Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and S.S. Shatalin, deputy director of the Central Mathematical Economics Institute. In the philosophy and law department, the first full membership available since 1966 went to the moderate director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, A.G. Yegorov.

In the elections to the economics department, Aganbegyan and Arbatov beat out such veterans as Stalinist N.A. Tsagolov, head of Moscow State University's political economy department, conservative L.M. Gatovskiy, director of the Institute of Economics until 1971 and then demoted to head of a department at that institute, and 74-year old conservative A.I. Pashkov.

Aganbegyan and Arbatov will increase the predominance of progressives in this department: of the six present full members, three are clearly progressives--Fedorenko, the academic secretary, A.M. Rumyantsev, former Vice President of the Academy of Sciences and former director of the Institute for Concrete Social Research, and N.N. Inozemtsev, director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The other three members are T.S. Khachaturov, editor of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, N.N. Nekrasov, chairman of the State Planning Commission's Council for Study of Production Forces, and A.N. Yefimov, deputy academic secretary of the department and director of Gosplan's Scientific Research Economic Institute. In addition, liberal mathematical economist L.V. Kantorovich, a full member of the academy's mathematics department, also participates in the work of the economics department, according to Aganbegyan's journal ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, No. 2, 1974.

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The innovators were further strengthened by the election of Ye. M. Primakov, deputy director of Inozemtsev's institute, and S.S. Shatalin, deputy director of Fedorenko's institute, as the two new corresponding members. Already among the corresponding members were two from Fedorenko's institute, T.V. Ryabushkin, head of a department, and P.G. Bunich, head of a laboratory, and two from Inozemtsev's institute, Deputy Director V.L. Tyagunenko and A.G. Mileykovskiy, head of a sector.

In winning the one philosophy position, Yegorov beat out Academy of Social Sciences Director M.T. Iovchuk and a number of other veteran philosophers and broke into a very select and conservative group. He is the first full member elected since the election of B.M. Kedrov in 1966; there were no openings for full members in the 1968, 1970, and 1972 academy elections. The only non-conservative among full members is Kedrov, who earlier this year was forced to resign as director of the Institute of Philosophy and was reduced to head of a sector in the Institute for History of Natural Sciences and Technology, which he had directed from 1962 to 1973. The other full members are conservatives F.V. Konstantinov, academic secretary of the department. M.B. Mitin, former editor of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Academy of Sciences Vice President P.N. Fedoseyev, and former Central Committee Ideology Secretary L.F. Ilichev.

State and Law Institute Director V.N. Kudryavtsev and three others were elected corresponding members of the philosophy and law department. Among the unsuccessful candidates for corresponding membership in philosophy were Agitprop first deputy head G.L. Smirnov, Institute of Philosophy Director B.S. Ukraintsev, Higher Party School Rector Ye. M. Chekharin, and the head of the Central Committee's philosophy sector, N.V. Pilipenko. This year no outspoken liberals were included in the list of candidates. Liberal sociologists and Rumyantsev associates Yu. A. Levada, G.V. Osipov and F.M. Burlatskiy had run in 1966 and 1970, and the outspoken QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editor I.T. Frolov ran in 1972, all unsuccessfully. The present corresponding members include the conservative director of the Institute of Sociological Research, M.N. Rutkevich, and moderates V.G. Afanasyev, new chief editor of KOMMUNIST, and D.M. Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology and Kosygin's son-in-law.

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ARMENIAN FIRST SECRETARY KOCHINYAN REMOVED

Climaxing a two-year crackdown on alleged misdeeds and shortcomings in Armenia, Moscow has removed longtime Armenian First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan. The reasons for his fall were not publicly revealed, but Moscow's dissatisfaction with the Armenian leadership has been evident since November 1972, when high-level dismissals began in the republic. Kochinyan, only 61, who reportedly asked to go on pension, was removed at a 27 November 1974 Armenian Central Committee plenum and replaced by the relatively obscure Armenian secretary for industry K.S. Demirchyan. Demirchyan had been promoted to that post from his position as Yerevan city second secretary only two years ago at the November 1972 Armenian plenum. Kochinyan's removal brings the situation in Armenia into line with those in neighboring Azerbaydzhan and Georgia, where the leaderships have been thoroughly purged for nationalism, corruption, and industrial and agricultural shortcomings.

When the purge began in November 1972, a Moscow cadre official came to Armenia and supervised the removal of the premier, the secretary for agriculture and the KGB chief.* A Russian was appointed to head the KGB, replacing a longtime Armenian chief. In March 1973 another Moscow cadre official supervised the removal and demotion of Second Secretary G.A. Ter-Gazaryants, an Armenian, and his replacement with the deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee cadre section, P.P. Anisimov, a Russian.** Further removals followed that spring, when Kochinyan began denouncing nationalism, corruption and economic mismanagement. The Armenian Central Committee cadre chief was also removed and demoted, a Ukrainian was named head of the Armenian Central Committee's agriculture section, and a new, apparently pro-Russian education minister was named.*** In November 1973 the secretary for ideology R.G. Khachatryan was removed.

With the present removal of Kochinyan, only three of the original nine Armenian bureau members elected at the last Armenian party congress remain in office: President N. Kh. Arutyunyan, former secretary for industry and now Premier G.A. Arzumaryan, and Yerevan First Secretary L.P. Garibdzhanyan.

* See the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, pages 29-30.

** See the TRENDS of 28 March 1973, pages 28-29.

*** See the TRENDS of 6 June 1973, pages 19-20.

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CHINA

CADRES URGED TO SUSTAIN PRODUCTION MOMENTUM OF ANTI-LIN DRIVE

A 28 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial entitled "Push Ahead with the Movement in Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius and Do It Well" appears aimed at insuring that the mass energies triggered by the lengthy campaign continue to be directed at increasing economic production. Crediting the year-long criticism campaign with bringing "vigorous development" to China's national economy, the editorial developed the thesis that "production shoots up when there is a good revolutionary situation, a correct line and unity among the masses."*

Cautioning cadres to avoid "any tendency toward complacency and slackness" in carrying the campaign forward, the editorial instructed local leaders to focus mass criticism on Lin's attempt to split the party and the revolutionary ranks. The editorial predicted that if party leadership and unity are strengthened, "we shall be able to broaden and deepen the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius over a long period of time and further step up production."

Peking radio on 1 December broadcast an article from RED FLAG, No. 12 which further linked the campaign to the need to increase economic production. The article emphasized the importance of finding a proper balance between struggle and unity so the anti-Lin struggle would serve to promote production. The article pointed out the responsibilities of leading cadres to see that more studying is done "at one's working post," declaring that "studying while working should be the major approach for the majority of the cadres and masses." Adopting a wait and see attitude toward errant leaders, the article noted that cadres guilty of "sabotaging revolutionary unity" should be "exposed" and struggled against "in good time."

PRODUCTION By linking economic production needs with the anti-Lin
PROBLEMS and Confucius campaign, Peking apparently hopes to
overcome various production difficulties which some
local units are experiencing. A 28 November Nanchang report on

* The current editorial is the first specifically devoted to the broad outlook for the ideological campaign since two major editorials in February 1974 established guidelines for the mass movement. Subsequent editorials in March, April, and July discussed the relationship between the campaign and agriculture, industry, and commerce respectively.

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a provincial party meeting held to map out agricultural plans revealed, for example, that there were "still certain weak spots in rural work" in Kiangsi. The broadcast complained that the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius was not developing evenly in the province and that in some places "attempts to launch farmland capital construction have been unsuccessful." And a 1 December Foochow report praising the work of a local commune's market management group contained a rare reference to the problems posed by "idle and unemployed persons" in Fukien. The management group was lauded for making arrangements for the idle and unemployed to "engage in decent activities of productive labor."

RED FLAG ARTICLE DEFENDS "NEW THINGS," NOTES NEW PROBLEMS

An article in RED FLAG, No. 12 carried by NCNA on 27 November enumerated a long list of revolutionary "new things" which must be defended, but it acknowledged that the development of new things has created "new problems" within the revolutionary ranks. The article took a relaxed view of the problems, however, noting the theoretical necessity for such contradictions. Acknowledging that "even within our revolutionary ranks" some people "knowingly or unknowingly" suppress new things through the force of habit, the article warned that people "within the revolutionary ranks" should be aided through education, and only class enemies should be subjected to exposure and criticism. The article admitted that some of the new things themselves "have problems," and called on people to actively help overcome shortcomings instead of merely negating the new things.

RED FLAG's current list of new things emphasized the moderate aspects of the campaign, leading off with praise for the study campaign rather than for mass criticism and next citing the structural reform of revolutionary committees operating under party leadership. Revolutionary committees had previously been listed as a new thing, and the reiteration of this assessment by RED FLAG seems to indicate that they will not be abolished, at least if an NPC is held in the near future.

Other new things mentioned by the article included reforms in culture, education, youth policies, medicine, and the composition of leading groups--all of which have been frequently included in such lists. Also included were the growth of Marxist theorists among the masses, the participation of leading cadres in labor, and unspecified "creations and inventions" in various fields.

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K O R E A

DPRK CALLS FOR UN TROOP WITHDRAWAL, NEW ROLE FOR NEUTRAL BODY

In his 25 November speech to the UN General Assembly, chief DPRK delegate Yi Chong-mok offered a new proposal for an increased role for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea, at the same time specifically endorsing the draft resolution calling for the withdrawal from South Korea of foreign troops under the UN flag. In 1973, when a compromise was reached avoiding a showdown vote on conflicting resolutions, Yi had not offered explicit support for the resolution sponsored by Algeria and other states.

Yi's suggestion on the NNSC came as a follow-up to Pyongyang's offer in November to form a joint North-South military commission to replace the present Military Armistice Commission, which has representatives from the UN command, North Korea, and China. Pyongyang's offer, made by DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Tam on 8 November, called for the two sides to hold bilateral military talks to discuss implementing the main provisions of the Korean armistice agreement. In an obvious effort to counter fears that removal of the UN presence might lead to a new Korean war, Yi added to Ho Tam's proposal the suggestion that the NNSC, which currently has a limited peace-keeping authority along the DMZ, be maintained "with necessary new functions" pending the eventual conclusion of a North-South peace agreement. Yi was vague, as was Ho Tam previously, about whether foreign troop withdrawal was a precondition to North-South military talks.

Yi also tied together and offered for UN consideration several other previous proposals--of varying vintage--concerning U.S. troop withdrawal and subsequent arrangements between Pyongyang and Seoul. Included were the oft-repeated March 1974 proposal for a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty and a less-frequently raised 1970 proposal that the North and South reduce troop strength to 100,000 men each.

Yi's anti-U.S. rhetoric was sharper than in his 1973 speech. Several times he linked foreign troop withdrawal from South Korea with peace in Asia, charging that the United States, after being driven out of most of Asia, sought to retain South Korea as its "most important stronghold for Asian aggression." Replying to the U.S. contention that its troops are in South Korea under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and not under UN auspices, Yi repeated Pyongyang's claim that the treaty is "illegal."

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Missing from this year's DPRK speech was last year's diatribe against "Japanese militarism." Also omitted was any reference to the question of separate UN entry for the two Koreas, which the North adamantly opposes and which was given extensive treatment in Yi's speech last year. The issue was raised this year, however, in the 7 October DPRK Government Memorandum, as well as in a 2 December NODONG SINMUN commentary which leveled the usual blast at South Korea's foreign minister for advocating separate UN admission during his UNGA speech.

PEKING ON
KOREAN ISSUE

In a 29 November speech, Chinese UN representative Huang Hua called for passage of the Algerian Resolution; in 1973 he had only asked that it be given "serious consideration." Huang claimed that South Korea has "all along been under the military, political, and economic control of the United States" and called the "longterm stationing" of U.S. troops in the South and U.S. interference in Korean affairs the "principal obstacle" to Korean reunification. He termed it "imperative" that all U.S. troops be withdrawn.

Recalling the 1973 UNGA decision on the Korean question, Huang accused South Korea--but not the United States--of trampling on the "spirit" of last year's "consensus." Calling past Security Council decisions on Korea "illegal," Huang vowed China would "firmly oppose" any attempt to refer the question of UN troops in Korea to the Security Council. Though he did not follow Pyongyang's lead in also calling the U.S.-ROK Defense Treaty "illegal," Huang did counter the argument that U.S. troops were in Korea under that treaty by claiming that no matter what label the troops were under, their purpose was to interfere in Korean affairs and perpetuate the division of the country. Moreover, he accused the United States of flagrantly violating the armistice agreement by not withdrawing its troops. NCNA replayed only portions of Huang's speech, omitting a long passage scoring the Pak government's domestic policies and a section praising Yi Chong-mok's "very reasonable and concrete proposals." NCNA replayed only portions of Yi's speech, too, notably omitting his proposal on North-South arrangements for replacing the Armistice Agreement.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON PRAGUE ANTI-EMIGRE CAMPAIGN: Moscow has appeared to give a boost to Bilak-style hardliners in Czechoslovakia by widely publicizing a recent Prague radio series which denounced in vitriolic terms liberals who had emigrated after the 1968 intervention. The series, entitled "Conversations From the Other Side," carried by the Prague radio and press beginning on 7 November, was reported at length in PRAVDA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the 19th, in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA on the 21st, again in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the 23d, and in a series of TASS reports. The Soviet publicity depicted the series as being popular in Czechoslovakia. The series featured taped conversations, purportedly covering a five-year period, between an alleged undercover agent, "Ervin Marak," and Czechoslovak emigres working at Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Deutsche Welle. The commentary accompanying the tapes portrayed the emigre circles as both fanatically anticommunist and demoralized, alleging that they were still appealing through Western broadcasts for establishment of a "bourgeois" regime in Czechoslovakia, despite the failure of their 1968 "counterrevolution." Moscow's show of partisanship is the more significant in that it comes against the background of continuing controversy over Prague policy toward the 1968 liberals between a conciliatory faction led by Husak and a hardline faction led by Bilak.

SPANISH CP-BLOC RELATIONS: A warming trend in relations between the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the CPSU and East European parties appears to be confirmed by joint communiques issued only six weeks apart after PCE delegation visits to Moscow and East Germany. The latest evidence of such rapprochement comes in the joint communique issued 2 December on the 28 November-3 December visit to the GDR by a PCE delegation headed by Secretary General Santiago Carrillo. The PCE and the East German SED declare in the communique that they "condemn any splitting activity against the internal unity of the communist parties," language virtually identical to that in the Moscow communique six weeks earlier after a USSR visit by another Carrillo-led PCE delegation. The reference to "splitting activity" relates to a pro-Moscow splinter faction of the PCE, led by Enrique Lister, which reportedly has received surreptitious Moscow support for four years. Such communique concessions to the PCE seem to bear out recent interview claims by Carrillo and other PCE leaders--in the Western press and on the PCE's clandestine Radio Independent Spain--that the CPSU is now giving the official PCE its support in PCE intraparty squabbles. The timing of the PCE delegation's Moscow visit, on the eve

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of a Warsaw consultative meeting of European communist parties, suggests a Moscow effort to cement relations before that forum as well as Soviet recognition of the PCE's important potential in Spain under a weakened Franco regime. Both the SED and CPSU communiques with the PCE also strongly affirmed that peaceful coexistence does not mean "preservation of the social and political status quo," an issue that earlier this year led to open polemics between the CPSU and the PCE in their respective party journals. Applying this principle to Spain, both communiques in effect called for the overthrow of the Franco regime, even though the GDR has had diplomatic relations with Madrid since January 1973, the establishment bringing a strong PCE rebuke of the SED at the time.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 25 NOVEMBER - 1 DECEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2601 Items)</u>			<u>Peking (1063 Items)</u>		
Mongolian 50th Anniver-	(5%)	13%	Albanian Liberation 30th	(--)	17%
sary			Anniversary		
[Brezhnev Speech in	(--)	5%]	UNGA Session	(18%)	17%
Mongolia			[Cambodia UN	(--)	6%]
Ford-Brezhnev Talks	(15%)	10%	Representation		
[Party-Government	(--)	2%]	[Palestine Debate	(9%)	3%]
"Approval"			[Korea Debate	(--)	3%]
PLO Leader 'Arafat in	(--)	5%	Kissinger in PRC	(--)	8%
USSR			[Communique	(--)	2%]
11th Romanian CP Cong-	(--)	5%	Criticism of Lin Biao	(10%)	8%
ress			and Confucius		
China	(4%)	5%	11th Romanian CP Cong-	(--)	6%
Yugoslav National Day	(--)	4%	ress		
			Cambodian Front Delega-	(--)	3%
			tion in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.